


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 16, 1966


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Dear Dick:

Here is a memorandum from Dr. Land and Dr. Purcell commenting on the Reconnaissance Panel meeting that was held last week on SIGINT satellites. Although this came to me just this morning, I thought you would like the opportunity to read it before our meeting this afternoon.

Sincerely,



Donald F. Hornig  
Special Assistant to the  
President for Science  
and Technology

The Honorable Richard Helms  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure,  #57,323

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15 DEC 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR

Dr. D. F. Hornig

Last week the Reconnaissance Panel spent two days in discussion with the CIA, NSA and NRO regarding SIGINT collection by satellite. It was not our intention to arrive at any detailed conclusions based on this one meeting and we did not conduct our discussion with this in mind. However, certain impressions about the program did come through and it may be useful for you to know our tentative thoughts on the subject.

First, we are distinctly impressed by the individual competence and thoroughness of the people that we talked to and with the technical sophistication of the systems in use and under development. At the same time, we feel that too little of this talent and technology is focused on the most critical questions of today and tomorrow.

Regarding the requirements making process in general, the Panel recognizes the difficulties the intelligence community faces in establishing consistent and reasonable requirements and priorities. We know that there is an unlimited demand for information distributed among many equally influential agencies and that all their needs must be somehow accommodated in the overall statement of national requirements. We also recognize that, as practical men, those who establish requirements only ask for those things that they understand can be feasibly obtained. However, it appears to us that in this environment three elements of information have been lacking which, if made regularly available to the requirements system, would help make the process more effective. They are: first, a clear statement of the important intelligence questions; second, a description of how our resources are allocated to answer each question and what our probability of success is; and third, analyses by the collection agencies which

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
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describe a spectrum of feasible systems and their capabilities for fulfilling hypothetical variations of the requirements. We encourage the initial efforts that the intelligence community has made in these areas.



Finally, the Panel spent considerable time discussing systems which might meet the urgent requirement to determine the characteristics of the Soviet ABM systems. We believe that the Panel in general would agree that the decisions that would be influenced by the information gathered about these defenses are of such magnitude that we ought not be satisfied with any collection system



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We will be happy to look at any of these points in more detail if you so desire.



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